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The Role of the International Community in Stopping the Zionist Aggression on the Gaza Strip

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Abstract. On October 7, 2023, Hamas began its military operation, dubbed the "Al-Aqsa Flood," which consisted of a massive and intensive missile attack that included the launch of 5,000 rockets that Iron Dome failed to confront. It targeted Israeli settlements from Dimona in the south to Hod Hasharon in the north and Jerusalem in the east. In conjunction with the missile attack, it bypassed the Palestinian youth resistance, which is divided into 14 attacking groups by means of vehicles, bicycles and gliders on settlements and military sites of the Zionist occupation in the vicinity of 40 km in the Gaza envelope, thus bypassing the separation wall, which former Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz described as "the smart defense marvel." Israel responded to the military operation with a devastating aerial bombardment to start its devastating war against Gaza.

Keywords: Gaza Strip, Iron Dome, and Zionist.

The Significance of the Research

The importance of the research lies in identifying the solutions offered to end the aggression of the Zionist entity, resolve the conflict away from wars and their tragedies, maintain international peace and security, and focus on relying on political means despite the difficulties of these efforts in light of the political changes in the international arena.

Research Objective

The link between the peaceful resolution of disputes, the maintenance of international peace and security, and the prevention of war is a coherent and coordinated link. Security is not established in the international community without ensuring the resolution of disputes and differences that occur by means in which force is not used.

Research Problem

Political, economic and judicial means have played a major role in settling international disputes. These means have proven their effectiveness and success in resolving disputes that threaten world peace. This in itself raises a problem that lies in the effectiveness of the international community in settling conflicts and ending the Zionist aggression on the Gaza Strip. A number of sub-questions arise from this main question, namely:

- What is the impact of Israeli influence on the global decision?
- What are the roles of the main organs of the United Nations in ending the Zionist aggression on Gaza?
- Has the war in Gaza affected Israeli-Arab relations?

- Will Israel's relations with each of the Arab Gulf countries, Egypt and Jordan continue?

Methodology

In this study, three scientific research methods were adopted for the expansion of the topic and its coverage of many issues. The historical approach was used to study the theoretical framework in the research and to show all the belongings of the Palestinian issue that occurred in the past time. The analytical approach was used to analyze the political variables in the positions of countries and their decision changed quickly. Finally, the probabilistic foresight approach was used to clarify the positions of the printing pressed Arab countries that were affected by the size of the aggression imposed by the Zionist entity against the Palestinian people.

Research Design

The first demand: The impact of Israeli influence on the decisions of the international community
First: Before the operation of the flood of Al-Aqsa
Second: After the operation of the flood of Al-Aqsa
The second demand: The role of the United Nations organs in stopping the war in Gaza
General Assembly
Second: The Security Council
court of justice
The third demand: The impact of the war in Gaza on the normalization of Israeli-Arab relations
GCC
Second: Egypt and Jordan
The first demand: The impact of Israeli influence on the decisions of the international community

Changing equations and imbalances mean much, big and dangerous. When all the features, features and lines of the general scene are clear and crystallized, everyone will have seen the magnitude of that change and imbalance.

First: Before the Operation of The Deluge of Al-Aqsa

The Al-Aqsa Flood Operation has great strategic importance because it establishes a change in the reality that Israel has tried to establish in the Gaza Strip since its withdrawal in 2005. This operation led to the collapse of the Israeli strategy and revealed the abject failure of various components of Israel's military and security system, which led to double the losses in the 1967 war and the October 1973 war, which is known in Israeli terminology as negligence(Hamdal). The operation came against the backdrop of the ongoing attacks by the most extreme right-wing government against the Palestinians and the paving the way for the storming of Palestinian camps and cities. Israel continued its siege since 2006 to curtail the rights of the Palestinians, which further worsened their situation, as well as the weakness of the Arab position towards these conditions [17].

Despite the lack of clarity in many technical details, but in the success and impact of the attack at the political and strategic level, and in order to study the ongoing conflict between Hamas and Israel, we should return to the form of the conflict ten years ago, which depended on the equations of deterrence and maneuvers below the level of war. Both parties maintained their military capabilities while pushing the resistance to manage the sector and its problems to trim its military performance [4], and the resistance did not plan to launch the battle of the Al-Aqsa Flood, until it developed its military capabilities and operational performance, and was keen with each round of conflict with Israel to modernize its arsenal of weapons and missiles [16], and set strategic goals based on the enemy's field movements since the beginning of the attack on Saturday morning, 7/10/2023, coinciding with the anniversary of the October 1973 victory between the Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades. Israel responded through Operation (Iron Swords), to reproduce the security chaos between the resistance and the entity in light of many securities, political and economic challenges in the countries of the Middle East [25].

Second: After the Operation of Al-Aqsa Flood

At the outset, we believe that the process of the flood of Al-Aqsa is the result of months of study and reading of facts with strategic content, and that it is a complex and multidimensional process that is not the result of chance because it has been studied, carefully planned and implemented more tightly [12].

On the other hand, the difficulty of setting goals, the resistance focused on many goals, including stopping the plan to end the Palestinian cause, putting it back on the international agenda after ignoring it for a long time, preventing Israel from infringing on Al-Aqsa and the Palestinian people, responding to Israel's violations of the

rights of the Palestinian people, and confronting the extreme right-wing government that was formed at the end of 2022. The operation of the Al-Aqsa Flood had a specific goal for what followed, which is how it will affect the priority of the Palestinian cause and the occupation pays a price [12] for its continuation.

We go back to the beginning of the operation, as the Palestinian resistance surprised at dawn on 7 October last year the Israeli occupation army, settlers of what is known as the "Gaza envelope", with an operation that astonished the entire world, for many reasons, including the quality of the operation, its tools and military tactics, and its achievement of its objectives in Israeli positions, as the scene of the Palestinian resistance crossing the separation wall between the Gaza Strip and Israeli settlements looked like the scene of Egyptian soldiers crossing the Bar Lev Line between the eastern Sinai Bank and its western bank, which Israel occupied in the 1967 war, amid the stupor of the Israeli occupation [8].

Given the effectiveness of the attack, the spokesman for the Israeli army, Lieutenant Colonel (Richard Hecht), said in a statement that the day of the flood of Al-Aqsa, which prompted what happened in the events of September 11, 2001, which hit the American interior [6].

Thus, since the end of last January, the occupation army has followed a new policy in the process of using and operating its forces in the theater of operations within the vision of the political and security level, which is as follows [9]:

1. Keeping the heads of the bridges that it has built on the outskirts of the areas of the sector and its center and starting from them towards the ground targets of the resistance without the task of building them again.
2. Maintaining contact with the resistance forces, testing their capabilities and defenses, and trying to drain them after more than a hundred days of war.
3. Relying on the principle of economy in forces and fire, that is, the reduction of military teams to three out of six military teams.
4. Focusing on quality operations through the tactic of special-purpose attacks such as raids and attacks by integrating the system of independent small groups but within the operational plan of the division and its brigade.
5. Collecting intelligence about the effective field leaders and targeting them directly with precision fire.
6. The greatest pressure on the popular incubator of the resistance in order to bring the resistance factions to their knees and weaken them and accept what is presented under the pretext of time and attrition of the internal front.

On the part of the resistance, and at the strategic level, Hamas introduced in the battle of Al-Aqsa Flood a rocket for the first time, which is a short range of 114 mm, and maintained the link between Jerusalem and Gaza with what it achieved in the battle of Saif Al-Quds in 2021 in a way that failed Sharon's divisive strategy, and among other tactics is the confusion of the Iron Dome through the simultaneous firing of a huge number of rockets that exceed the ability of the Iron Dome to repel [9].

At the level of success in surprise, the success of the resistance is due to its capabilities, maneuvering and deceiving the enemy, and secondly to a deficiency in Israeli estimates that its army is unbeatable and the exclusion of the possibility of an explosion of the situation, as well as the policy of escalation it is taking against the Palestinian people [9].

In the context of the political and humanitarian repercussions, the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor said that Israel's military attacks on Gaza indicate a bloody policy based on systematic killing and horrific destruction, as the murder rate has risen in an unprecedented manner in the history of wars. The Euro-Med Monitor estimated the rate of infant deaths to have risen to 200 due to the continuous Israeli attacks on Gaza, and confirmed that its direct air strikes against civilian objects in Gaza have left horrific destruction and turned it into an unlivable city, and at least a third of the city was destroyed by Israeli air and artillery attacks around it into a city clouded by rubble and the smell [13] of gunpowder.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, stated that the situation in the Gaza Strip is catastrophic and inhumane because of the acute shortage of water, food, medicines and fuel. In the context of his call for the entry of aid, despite the entry of about 20 trucks of aid, it is much less than what the population in the Gaza Strip needs, according to the government media office in Gaza, as it constitutes only 3% of what is entered per day of health needs before [13] the Israeli aggression.

In general, the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation constituted an actual rather than hypothetical strategic turning point and consolidated the trend of the transition of confrontation from armies to armed popular resistance. It also devoted a positive aspect to the international community and its support for the Palestinian cause and the call to stop the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip.

The second demand: The role of the United Nations organs in stopping the aggression on Gaza

Israel responded to the Al-Aqsa Flood operation with a devastating aerial bombardment that targeted schools, residential neighborhoods, refugee camps, oppression of unarmed people, the destruction of the city and its siege, preventing the entry of food and medicines, and cutting off water and electricity, with accusations of the Zionist

entity using internationally prohibited white phosphorus in violation of international humanitarian law. Tel Aviv did not heed some of the calls that asked them to observe the rules of international humanitarian law in Gaza because of the fall of its prestige as a result of the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, which revealed the utter failure of the various components of the military and security system on which the Zionist entity relied in implementing its strategy [31].

Western countries did not condemn Israel's war, but the Western governments and media complicit with it provided it with a full justification for committing war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Palestinian people in Gaza. This revealed the absolute racism, hypocrisy and double standards in the West's policy towards the people of Palestine, which is the falsehood of the example adopted by the West and based on selectivity, especially with regard to respecting the rules of international humanitarian law and human rights, which contradicts what the West used in their speeches and demands to condemn Russia for violating the rules of international law in its conflict with Ukraine. This selectivity confirmed that the West's policy is based on defending their interests and not preserving international security [28], and through this we must address the position of the main organs of the United Nations to resolve the conflict in Gaza.

General Assembly

The endeavors of the United Nations General Assembly were launched based on the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination, which is the cornerstone of contemporary international life. This right is the legal tool to enable peoples subject to colonialism to achieve independence and freedom, establish independent entities and achieve national sovereignty. It is based on the obligation of all States to respect the right of peoples and nations to self-determination and self-determination, which is exercised in complete freedom away from external pressures aimed at restricting human rights and fundamental freedoms in particular. In light of the sanctity of the Charter of the United Nations and its organs to this principle, we see that there are many abuses that hinder the application of this principle to show the double standards in dealing with some international issues, and with regard to the Palestinian issue, we see that the United Nations had been unable to apply this principle and justification because of the veto (veto) used by the major powers in an unjust manner against the right of vulnerable countries [7].

After the catastrophic aggression practiced by the Zionist entity against the Palestinian people, and the failure to reach a resolution by the Security Council obliging everyone to cease fire because of the use of the United States of America's veto against any resolution stipulating a ceasefire, the Arab countries came to the General Assembly in their discussion to resolve the crisis, so the General Assembly adopted a resolution demanding the release of the hostages to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza, during the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, which resumed discussing: (Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory), was issued by the resolution submitted by twenty-one Arab countries and supported by a large number of United Nations Member States. The resolution called for an immediate ceasefire on humanitarian grounds, and reiterated the General Assembly's demand for all parties to comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, especially with regard to the protection of civilians. The resolution was entitled (Protection of civilians and adherence to legal and humanitarian obligations), and stressed that Palestinian and Israeli civilians must be protected in accordance with international humanitarian law, as it approved the resolution by 153 countries and abstained and rejected by 23 countries. 10 Member States led by the United States, the General Assembly reflects public opinion and its significant political weight can affect the decisions of Member States and lead to the stigmatization of some. These decisions can also result in international actions that affect the situation on the ground [10], while the United States of America has strongly opposed the demands for a ceasefire because it believes that this decision will be in the interest of the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, and Washington proposed a truce to protect civilians and allow the release of detainees, and this was confirmed by Richard Joan, Director of the International Crisis Group at the United Nations that the United States is more isolated from the mainstream opinion at the United Nations [10].

As for the positions of the member states of the United Nations, they have gone through a process of major shifts during the last vote on the draft resolution, whether from rejection to abstention, or from abstention to approval. For example, there are many countries that are allies of the United States, such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada. South Korea voted in favor of the last resolution, after abstaining from voting in the previous resolution. Australia, together with Canada and New Zealand, issued a joint statement supporting the ceasefire. The United Kingdom, Ukraine, Italy and Germany remained [29] determined to abstain.

Second: The Security Council

The Zionist aggression on Gaza raised questions about the effectiveness of the UN institutions in ensuring international peace and security. The Security Council plays a pivotal role in addressing and resolving international conflicts, but the response of the Security Council to resolve the bloody war and aggression against the Palestinian people was very fragile, which made many question the extent of its impact on global stability, especially since the failure to adopt a UN resolution to stop the asymmetric war gives an international tender to the Zionist entity to continue implementing its unjust expansionist plans against the Palestinian people. Not only that, but the continuation of the war increases the fears of the international community of the expansion of the conflict beyond its geographical scope to make the conflict in Gaza the most threatening event to the stability of the Middle East, which prompted the diplomatic networks of many countries to ward it off. Although Washington provides tremendous support to its largest ally in the Middle East, it does not want the conflict to expand and the United States is forced to be a party to it. Russia has also entered the diplomatic arena, especially after many contacts between Russia on the one hand and Iran, Syria, Egypt, Mahmoud Abbas and Netanyahu in order to express Russia's position on the crisis and listen to the considerations of these players. The closest possible description of this war is ethnic cleansing after the great aggression of the entity, which left a great loss of life and forced civilians to migrate from their homes. This has angered many countries inside and outside the region, and has also raised global tensions that are increasing day by day, and world peace is threatened with imminent danger, which led the international community to look to international organizations, especially the Security Council, which seeks, through diplomacy and sanctions, to assume responsibility for maintaining international peace and security [1].

(Working harder to end the war in Gaza and recognize the state of Palestine) were the most important messages sent by many countries that participated in the UN Security Council discussions to search for a way out of the conflict. After more than a month of continuous Israeli bombardment, and the fifth time it was requested, the UN Security Council called for a humanitarian truce in addition to the release of prisoners held by Hamas, and three permanent members with the right of veto (the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia) abstained. Israel rejected the resolution as meaningless and continued its shelling and ground attack on the besieged area. After Israel launched its ground attack on Gaza on October 27 preceded by air strikes in the weeks following the attack by the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas on October 7, the United Nations General Assembly held an emergency session. With reports that more than 7,000 civilians were killed in Gaza, the General Assembly issued a resolution calling for "an immediate, permanent and sustainable humanitarian truce leading to a cessation of hostilities." At the same time, the United Nations Security Council, which The primary responsibility for international peace and security, and by October 27 of last year, the UN Security Council voted on four resolutions, but all failed. In order for the resolution to pass, it must receive at least nine votes in favor and not be vetoed by a permanent member. All five permanent members of the Security Council (France, China, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) used the veto, revealing deep divisions in addressing the crisis. These four resolutions can be clarified as follows [19]:

1. It voted on the first of the four resolutions proposed by Russia on October 17, but the United States, France and Britain vetoed the resolution and called for a ceasefire on humanitarian grounds. The United States also objected to the non-recognition of Israel's right to self-defense.
2. It voted on the second resolution proposed by Brazil on October 18, but it still attracts the veto by the United States of America due to the lack of mention of the entity's right to self-defense.
3. On 25 October, the Security Council met to vote on draft resolutions submitted by the United States and Russia. Naturally, the focus of the US resolution was on the right of self-defense, which led to the use of Russia and China's double veto.
4. The United States vetoed the Russian resolution, which, like its predecessor, did not get enough votes in favor of its adoption. The Security Council reached an impasse with the firm opposition of the United States to the ceasefire on humanitarian grounds.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned that “Gaza has become a cemetery for children” and announced a local tactical pause for humanitarian aid. On 15 November, Malta successfully tabled a resolution in the Security Council calling for an urgent and prolonged ceasefire and humanitarian corridors, which Israel strongly rejected. Under Article 99, the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that he considers may threaten international peace and security. On 6 December, Guterres drew the attention of the Security Council to the human suffering caused by the hostilities in Gaza and Israel as a matter that may exacerbate existing threats to international peace and security. Article 99 is important and as the most powerful tool available to the Secretary-General, it has been used only 6 times since 1950, but it does not necessarily prompt Security Council action. The fact is that the Security Council, under the Charter of the United Nations, retains discretion as to how to act, or if it has to act at all.

In light of this, Israel accused UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in a report of failing to respond appropriately to a new UN report that found evidence of sexual violence during Hamas's attack on the entity in the Al-Aqsa Flood. The report indicated that there were reasonable grounds to believe that sexual violence occurred in at least three locations in the October 7 attack, namely the site of the Nova Music Festival and the area surrounding Highway 232 and Kibbutz Rim. Although the report indicated that Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups claimed responsibility for the attack, it did not attribute sexual violence to any specific [15] armed group.

International Court for Justice

The International Court of Justice is the main judicial organ of the United Nations, entrusted with the task of settling legal disputes referred to it by States in accordance with international law, providing advisory legal opinions on legal matters referred to it by the organs of the United Nations and its specialized international agencies authorized under Article 96 of the Charter of the Organization, and issuing decisions of the Court based on applicable international treaties and conventions, in addition to international custom, general principles of public international law, international judicial rulings, and the doctrines of senior authors of international law, as subsidiary means [11], South Africa filed the lawsuit in the International Court of Justice, and asked it to impose emergency measures to stop the fighting that claimed the lives of many innocent Palestinians. The International Court of Justice requested Israel to prevent and punish incitement to genocide against Palestinians, as part of its preliminary ruling on the lawsuit filed without ordering a ceasefire as requested by South Africa. During the ruling, the judges stressed that Israel must take all measures within its authority to prevent and punish its forces from committing acts of genocide, in addition to taking the necessary steps to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza. That the Zionist entity repudiates the ruling to implement the judgment against it on the charge of genocide [22].

The third demand: The impact of the war in the Gaza Strip on the normalization of Israeli-Arab relations

There are Arab considerations and geopolitical and security considerations that have made the Arab countries take a major position and side since the beginning of the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip on October 7, 2023, and thus the Arab countries differed towards the war, and with this demand we take two parts of the countries:

First: GCC

With reference to the history of Palestinian resistance to Israeli aggression, it has been sequenced in several stages, the last of which was between 1994-2023. In 2002, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia put forward the Arab Initiative, which included full recognition and normalization with Israel in exchange for a Palestinian state. It began to implement individual and collective meetings without the establishment of a Palestinian state. Normalization processes began in 2020 in the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan [27] and Morocco. However, the repercussions of the process led to high oil and gas prices in international markets, as well as tension and instability in the Gulf region due to the escalation in the process of the Al-Aqsa Deluge. [5] As the war escalates in the region, the Gulf countries condemned the Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip and demanded an immediate cessation of military operations. The Gulf countries took steps towards their relationship with Israel. For example, Saudi Arabia decided to freeze negotiations with Israel in order to normalize relations between them, in addition to condemning Israel and holding it responsible for the tension that is taking place, while Bahrain and the UAE, starting from the signing of the Abraham Peace Accords in August 2020, did not take any punitive measures towards Israel, but they took the diplomatic side to stop the military escalation. The positions of the rest of the Gulf countries Like Kuwait, Qatar and the Sultanate of Oman, it was the most condemnatory of Israel [30], and the observer at the Arab Center in Washington(Christian Coates Ulrich Sen) expressed the positions of the Gulf countries towards the escalation in Palestine, that the Gulf countries did not have a single position towards Israel , for example, Kuwait refuses to establish any relationship with Israel, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the Sultanate of Oman adopt the approach of (practical coexistence), while the UAE and Bahrain adopted the approach of normalizing relations in full. In the context of practical events, the Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, sought an emergency meeting of the OIC countries in Jeddah on 18 October and a joint summit with the League of Arab States on the same day, and the meeting highlighted the lack of consensus on the extent to which Israel could go with its aggression and sanctions measures against it, and in response to this, the Gulf countries face challenges towards their positions with Gaza and at the same time in response to the angry masses [23].

In general, the Gulf countries express their fears of the continuation of the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip, and in the statements of the Saudi Foreign Minister (Walid Al-Khuraiji), he said: "The continuation of the Gaza war and its prolongation leads to an unjustified humanitarian disaster, which threatens to drag the region into wider conflicts that undermine the strengthening of regional security and disrupt the chances of peace in the region [24].

Second: Egypt and Jordan

(a) Egypt:

Egypt is the only Arab country bordering the Gaza Strip with its 14km border with Gaza, and upon return, important events arise towards the Palestinian cause. The first was the date of the tripartite aggression against Egypt in October 1956, as Gaza was under Egyptian administration, and because of the formation of the 141st Palestinian Battalion under the then President (Gamal Abdel Nasser), which caused a threat to Israel's security and hit its Zionist project. The second was Israel's occupation of Gaza in June 1967 and the Egyptian-Arab defeat, but Egypt was keen to support the Palestinian cause, and it was the largest supporter of the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964. While the third is the history of the relationship between Egypt and Palestine until now, and its beginning was the signing of the Egyptian President at the time (Anwar Sadat), (Camp David Agreement) in September 1967, and this was the beginning of Egypt's exit from the conflict with Israel and the beginning of the transformation of the Arab-Israeli conflict into a conflict between Israel and each country separately [14], and Egypt's role also comes in containing the crises and armed conflicts between the Palestinian resistance and Israel, its role was successful many times, most recently in the Egyptian city of Al-Alamein in July last year in the presence of the Palestinian President (Mahmoud Abbas) and reaching effective truce agreements that lasted for varying periods, and the former Assistant Foreign Minister for African Affairs and Secretary General of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs (Ali Al-Hafni) said: "Cairo responds to the allegations in a practical manner through extensive contacts with international and Arab parties, as well as Palestinians and Israelis to stop the violence and reach a truce [21].

From the above, we find that the Egyptian position saw that the Israeli reaction went beyond the right of self-defense to collective punishment of the people of Gaza, and also expressed its position rejecting the displacement of Palestinians from their land because it would eliminate the Arab cause, which is the Palestinian cause [26].

(b) Jordan

The importance of Jordan's role comes as it is at the heart of any potential regional confrontation, and the launch of the Al-Aqsa Flood process has posed a military and security challenge. On the other hand, its role is centered on the Palestinian issue as it carries political, geographical and demographic dimensions as well as border adherence with occupied Palestine, but its political role is within the axis of Arab moderation, so the official behavior is in accordance with the requirements of this axis.

On the other hand, by virtue of the various periods in which the Palestinian conflict with the Israeli aggression intensified, the reason for the increase of Palestinian refugees to the Jordanian side, such as the period between 1948 and 1967. The constitutional integration of the West Bank with Jordan, which was occupied in 1967, has a historical responsibility to restore it. On the other hand, it is linked to a peace treaty with the Israeli aggression and to various agreements such as the gas agreement, the industrial zones agreement, the energy water exchange agreement and others. It is also linked to defense cooperation agreements with the United States of America, which began in March 2021 and includes allowing the US military to use Jordanian territory in exchange for military, economic and political support by the United States of America, as well as with European countries such as Britain, [2] France and Germany.

In light of the frequency of attitudes towards the operation of the Al-Aqsa Flood, the Jordanian position was strong at first, but it was affected by a number of factors, the most prominent of which were [3]:

1. The demographic factor and the pressure of the Jordanian people who interacted with the Al-Aqsa Flood process and the interaction of the people included all Jordanian regions.
2. Concern about the threat to the security of the northern and eastern borders against the backdrop of escalation in the Gaza Strip.
3. Jordan's strategic relations with the United States of America, which made it biased towards the Israeli aggression.
4. The Wadi Arava Treaty in 1994 and the political and economic commitments it contained between the two parties.
5. Its tepid relationship with Hamas, and its negative attitudes towards the movement and the movements of political Islam.

The Jordanian Foreign Minister (Ayman Safadi) pointed out in the early days of the operation: "Hamas is an idea, and the idea does not end." He explained that Hamas did not create the conflict, but the conflict created it. He also called for a cessation of escalation and condemned Israeli violations against the Palestinian people. The Jordanian position continued to move within the framework of the need for a ceasefire [17] and the emphasis on the two-state solution. The measures it took were to cancel the quadrilateral summit that was scheduled to be held on 18/10 of last year, freeze the energy-for-water agreement, close foreign military bases, and support [3] the Palestinian resistance.

As such, the Jordanian position has tended to put pressure on Arab allies and the West, reduce its diplomatic relations with Israel, as well as postpone the agreements concluded with Israel, and break the siege by increasing humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip [17].

CONCLUSION

The Al-Aqsa Flood operation revealed the ambition of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to invade Gaza on the Gaza Strip and proved the depth of the American Zionist strategic relations. The latter threw its weight on the government of the Zionist entity and supported them greatly to declare war on Gaza. Washington not only pledged military support, but also Biden pledged to support the entity further to show the world the duplicity of the West in their perception of the conflict.

Conclusions

1. Israel continues to violate the rules of international law after failing to implement the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the International Court of Justice.
2. The United States of America continues to veto any decision that stops aggressive actions against the Palestinian people, which means giving the green light to the Zionist entity to oppress the Palestinian people.
3. Increasing tension in the Middle East to make the region a ring of fire and that any expansion outside the circle of conflict will ignite war in the region.
4. The General Assembly is concerned about the situation in the war on Gaza and the resolutions it has adopted in order to stop the armed conflict, but Israel has not complied with those resolutions because it knows that the General Assembly resolutions are not binding.
5. Lack of role of regional organizations, especially the League of Arab States.

Recommendation

1. Pressure on the United States of America and its allies in the Security Council to persuade them after the use of the veto against any UN humanitarian resolution approving the cessation of military actions.
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations should take serious action to end the war by pressuring the Security Council to take advantage of the decision of the Union for Peace and the articles of the Charter of the United Nations to get rid of the dilemma of the right of veto against the decision to stop the conflict.
3. Arab and Islamic countries should intensify the requests submitted to demand the cessation of the entity.
4. Intensifying diplomatic efforts to obtain at least a long-term truce to avoid further massacres and famines to which the people of Gaza are exposed.
5. The imposition by the Arab and Islamic countries of a complete economic boycott with the Zionist entity to force it to stop the violence against the Palestinian people

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